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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview
1.1 Introduction
International institutions greatly influence the political economy of states. Through
international institutions the international community has played a major role in the
Palestinian territories, particularly since the Oslo Accords in 1993, in formulating a
neoliberal framework for political and economic development for a potential Palestinian
state and economy. For purposes of this paper, institutions are defined as “persistent and
connected sets of rules and practice that prescribe roles, certain activity, and shape the
expectations of actors.”1 Institutions may include organizations, bureaucratic regimes,
treaties and agreements, and informal practices that states accept as binding. The balance
of power in the international system is an example of an institution.2 This thesis analyzes
the role of international institutions in the concept and planning for a potential Palestinian
state.
The institutional norms and logic of every major development and financial
organization working in the Palestinian territories agrees that state formation in Palestine
should be based on neoliberal political and economic theory. The actors in this scheme
include the major international development and financial organizations (United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
Quartet (United Nations (UN), US, European Union (EU), Russia), various UN agencies,
the European Commission (EC), etc.) along with individual state-based international

1

Peter Hass, Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy, Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International
Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 4 – 5.
2
Ibid, 4 – 5.
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development agencies (United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), etc.). While the activities of each
organization take on different priorities and emphasis, all political and economic
development projects support the configuration of social forces toward the consolidation
of neoliberal hegemony in conceptualizing Palestine.
The conceptualization of a Palestinian state and a state formation process should
not be misconstrued in conventional terms, meaning monopolization over the use of
violence, coercion, institutions, and territory.3 Rather the notions that surround
Palestinian statehood and a formative process therein, as represented by dominant social
forces (Israel, the US, international institutions, and Palestinian elites) do not require the
establishment of a Palestinian state per se. Importantly, this paper uses the phrases
“Palestinian state formation” and “Palestinian state” in a manner consistent with
international social forces as defined by various international institutions, meaning that
the neoliberal conceptualization of Palestinian state formation is far more important for
dominant social forces than actually creating a state. In fact, Palestine‟s
internationalization may make a state – conceptualized in the traditional sense –
unnecessary to the realization of the goals of Palestinian, Israeli, and global capital. A
neoliberal conceptualization of Palestine means that no state is actually required to induce
into existence the neoliberal condition in Palestine.
Below, I will analyze international institutions through a neo-Gramscian
theoretical framework in two phases – the Oslo period (1993 – 2000), and the post-Oslo

3

Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” originally published October 1918; available, www.sscnet.ucla.edu;
"State" The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics, (eds.) Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009); available, www.oxfordreference.com.
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period (2000 – present) – to investigate the raison d’être and dynamics of international
institutions in configuring Palestinian social forces toward neoliberal state formation.
Furthermore, this study investigates how international institutions shape the notion of a
future Palestinian state through their policy recommendations and development projects,
which ensures neoliberal policies and values in the conceptualizing a Palestinian state
building project.
1.2 Research Hypothesis
International institutions configure Palestine in two major ways toward the neoliberal
condition. First, international institutions play a major role in shaping the notion of
Palestinian state formation through their relationship with Israel. Support for agreements
that clearly favor the industrialized, sovereign state of Israel perpetuate the colonial
relationship that Israel and its supporters bring to the conceptualization of Palestinian
state formation. Second, international institutions ensure a neoliberal project in the
schema of Palestinian state formation through policy prescriptions and development
projects that guide the concept and planning for a potential Palestinian state toward the
dominant neoliberal ideology in an emerging world order. This logic is consequently
embedded within Palestinian political economy and represented through official political
and economic discourse. Elite Palestinian social forces agree to terms that are mutually
agreeable because of their individual capital accumulation in this process. Elite
Palestinian social forces comprise those built into the construction of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) and other positions of political prominence along with the forces of

6

Palestinian private capital, in the Palestinian territories and the Diaspora.4 Terms that are
mutually agreeable include the vision, recommendations, and implementation of the
framework through the conduit of international institutions and embedded within
Palestinian political economy.
Through these means, international institutions ideologically ensure neoliberal
political and economic values in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation. This study
analyzes the relationship between international institutions and state formation in
Palestine through a neo-Gramscian perspective, utilizing concepts such as hegemony,
world order, and internationalization of the state to show what is being created in
Palestine and how this is being done. Although political and economic liberalism existed
in the Palestinian territories prior to the 1990s, the framework was directly implemented
during the Oslo process (1993 – 2000), when international institutions came en masse to
the Palestinian territories to aid the Oslo process and assist in conceptualizing Palestine
through neoliberal policy prescriptions and development projects.
1.3 Theoretical Framework: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective
A number of concepts from a neo-Gramscian perspective are useful for analyzing the
relationship between international institutions and Palestinian state formation. Robert
Cox initially brought the critical approach to international relations in the early 1980s
through his seminal articles appearing in Millennium – “Social Forces, States and World
Order” and “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations.”5 In these writings, Cox

4

See Figure 1: Palestinian Political Structure.
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expounded on a number of Gramscian concepts to illuminate a new approach for
exploring the dynamics of international relations and international political economy. For
purposes of this paper, I engage several neo-Gramscian concepts such as hegemony,
world order, and internationalization of the state to investigate and illuminate the
relationship between international institutions and Palestinian state formation.
Cox‟s revival of Gramci‟s innovative conceptualization of hegemony is more
flexible than realist approaches because it does not depend solely on a dominant state, but
rather a confluence of social forces that are consolidated through coercion and consent in
power dynamics. Social forces can exist within states, but are not delimited by national
boundaries.6 In this schema, the world is a configuration of interacting social forces,
where the state acts as a semi-autonomous intermediary in social relations between global
and local social forces.7 In the process of hegemonic consolidation, consent is partly
garnered through the production and changing of institutions, because institutionalization
of certain ideas creates norms. Institutions also largely eliminate the need for force, as
they represent non-violent forms of consent. In this way, a neo-Gramscian conception of
hegemony entails a cultural element such as morals, social values, and beliefs, which are
integrated in the (contested) process for hegemonic consolidation. In short, neoGramscian hegemony is a matrix of power, ideas, and institutions.8
The process for national hegemonic consolidation is constantly contested and
does not follow a linear path, as hegemony is a glimpse of a moment, not an eternal end
1571, originally published in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10 no. 2 (1981): 126 – 155, and
“Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method” in Critical Concepts in Political
Science Vol. 3 by Andrew Linklater (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2000): 1207 – 1222, originally
published in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 no. 2 (1983): 162 – 175.
6
Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 1554.
7
Ibid, 1554.
8
Ibid, 1553.
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game. According to Cox, “hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behavior in most
people most of the time.”9 Hegemony is a constant negotiation and struggle for a social
class to exert itself, while co-opting enough oppositional elements to have the appearance
and appeal of universality. In this way, hegemony or consolidation thereof on national or
international levels is never absolute. A neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony therefore
avoids some of the criticisms of earlier Marxist theories that were layered in deterministic
assumptions.10
The international expansion of a particular hegemony signals the process whereby
world hegemony could be created. This can happen from particular social forces
consolidating within a state and pushing that hegemonic project toward a world scale or it
could be a configuration of social forces between states that are seeking consolidation
through further integration with each other in world order.11 According to Cox, world
order is conceptualized in that “ „World‟ designates the relevant totality, geographically
limited by the range of probable interaction…„Order‟ is used in the sense of the way
things usually happen...”12 The nation-state system is one historical form of world order.
A world order is composed of interacting social forces, although not limited to state
entities. Our current moment, one of an emerging world order, is highly influenced by
neoliberal political economy. According to David Harvey:
“Neoliberalism in the first instance is a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
9

Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations,” 1210.
While this has been a critique of orthodox Marxism, this has also been problematic is dependency and
world systems approaches.
11
Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton, “A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order, and Historical
Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations,” Class and Capital 82 (2004): 93.
12
Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 1565.
10
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characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The
role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to
such practices.”13
Neoliberalism embraces free market relationships – free enterprise, labor that is flexible
to market demands, and states that provide regulatory and legal frameworks through
policies and institutions that support capital accumulation. At our current juncture, the
role of the state plays an important role in a neoliberal-influenced emerging world order,
which is to secure the accumulation of capital among a small, but powerful elite through
institutional and policy-oriented mechanisms. These mechanisms create the legal and
regulatory environment that is necessary for neoliberal capital accumulation to occur
among elite social forces. States develop institutions and policies to establish the
conditions under which this can occur such as guaranteeing the integrity of money or
creating markets where none previously existed, such as water.14
The neoliberal framework, values, and ideology are subsumed structurally within
governance institutions and spaces of capital. While neoliberalism as a term is generally
applied by critics, the ideology in embodied across the political spectrum and within a
wide range of policies throughout the world. More tangibly, neoliberalism is located
within social forces and key institutions that work together, such as multinational capital,
Ministries of Finance and/or Treasury, think tanks, and international organizations such
as the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO). 15 Neoliberal
terminology such as “good governance,” “private-sector driven growth,” “fiscal
discipline,” “export promotion,” “poverty reduction,” and “economic reform,” are
13

David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.
Ibid, 2.
15
Wendy Larner, “Neoliberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentability,” Studies in Political Economy 63
(Autumn 2000): 8.
14
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utilized to put a positive spin on processes that downsize the public sector and
government provisioning of social welfare. In this logic, individuals are to become
healthy and responsible producers and consumers, while infrastructure should be
developed to make capital investment and trade easier – all of which are necessary for a
business friendly environment and the accumulation of capital.
Neoliberalism has been enshrined in a number of elite-based “consensuses,”
which represent how the process for hegemonic consolidation of an ideology is
negotiated within an emerging world order. In 1989, the neoliberal framework was
articulated into a list of policy prescriptions known as the “Washington Consensus” by
John Williamson, then Chief Economist of the World Bank in South Asia. The so-called
Washington Consensus was particularly timely given the fall of state capitalism in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Following this time-period, many non-dominant states
underwent national restructuring at the behest of international institutions through
macroeconomic structural adjustment programs, whose main aim was to free capital
through deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of capital, investment, and trade.
This is why structural adjustment programs that were implemented with the assistance of
international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF were almost exact replicas of
the recommendations enshrined in the Washington Consensus and became equivalent
with national restructuring and development. Since that time, neoliberal capitalism has
entered what Joseph Stieglitz, former head of the World Bank, has termed the “PostWashington Consensus,” followed by another round of elite-based consensuses at
Monterrey and Doha. While the thrust of neoliberalism has been carried through a
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number of conceptualizations and the rhetoric varies slightly in each, there are no major
structural differences in each neoliberal consensus.
International social forces have created a hegemonic project around neoliberal
political economy and there appears to be an ideological consensus among elite social
forces regarding the framework, but world hegemony of neoliberalism in total that
informs the construction of world order has not yet been consolidated. In this sense, there
is an emerging world order where international institutions facilitate the particularities of
neoliberalism and the configuration of social forces toward neoliberal hegemonic
consolidation in world order. As an expression of universal norms, international
institutions facilitate world order. They play a very important role in representing and
expanding hegemony ideologically and tangibly. They assist ideologically in the
standardization of domestic policies, such as trade and finance, with those of a neoliberal
world economy. On the ground, this means helping create appropriate policy frameworks
with pertinent governance institutions and advancing established international practices
through development projects in developing states.
International organizations bring international norms and practices of neoliberal
development to transitional and developing states through policy advice and donor
funded development projects. International institutions play a major role in these
processes although for purposes of this paper, it is their role in assisting in national
(re)structuring that is of primary importance. Since the state of Palestine has never
existed, international institutions simply seek to structure Palestine along neoliberal lines.
This was the primary objective for international institutions in entering the Palestinian
territories during the Oslo process. Through neoliberal policy recommendations and
12

development projects, international institutions ideologically ensure neoliberal values in
the conceptualization and planning of Palestinian state formation.
Through various means, such as the opening of national economies for diversified
and internationalized production, services, communications, and finance, the notion of
international obligation, integrated military cooperation such as NATO, and international
assistance for reconstruction and development especially in the post-WWII period
indicate that states have become internationalized.16 Importantly, a neo-Gramscian
approach does not argue that states are disappearing in the face of global integration. On
the contrary, it argues that states are being restructured in this dynamic process.
Internationalization of the state means that states have become more salient to
international practices, rules, and norms. Particularly in the post-WWII reconstruction
process and in the debt crisis of the 1970s-80s, international institutions have penetrated
non-dominant states through macroeconomic stabilization and development programs,
albeit is slightly different ways. Cox notes that,
“Economically weak countries were to be given assistance by the system itself,
either directly through the system‟s institutions or by other states nominally
certified by the system‟s institutions. These institutions incorporated mechanisms
to supervise the application of the system‟s norms and to make financial
assistance effectively conditional upon reasonable evidence of intent to live up the
norms.”17
An internationalized state becomes a “transmission belt” from the national to global
economy.18 In this way, a neoliberal state is one that has been internationalized, at least to
some degree. In the emerging world order, states act as “intermediate though

16

Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 1558.
Ibid, 1558.
18
Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 302.
17
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autonomous” mechanisms between domestic and global social forces.19 In these
processes, international and sometimes transnational social forces have emerged in the
form of capitalists, state managers, intellectuals, and personnel of international
organizations.20 Domestically, this is prioritized in governance institutions where local
social forces tend to interact with international social forces such as the Prime Minister‟s
office, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Planning.21 The coherence and unity of these
social forces should not be overstated, as suggested by critics, because the process for
hegemonic consolidation of social forces (whether on the national or international level)
is always contested.22 Neoliberal configurations are complex and hybrid, representing
general thrusts rather than fixed formations. In addition, it is important to take seriously
the critique that internationalization of the state has a deterministic and hierarchical
tendency, which can ignore counter-hegemonic agents in the process.23 In this light, the
concept needs re-rooting in what makes a neo-Gramscian analysis so appealing in the
first place – that the process for hegemonic consolidation among various social forces
should wholly be seen as dynamic and contested.
Capitalism, but particularly its neoliberal variant, has always required a
transnational network of capitalists to sustain it. The norms, rules, and practices (the
institutionalization of neoliberalism) are brought to the Palestinian territories through
international organizations and domestic elites that are integrated into global capital.
19

Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Order,” 1554.
Ibid, 1561.
21
Ibid, 1559.
22
Daniel Egan, “Global Capitalism and the Internationalization of the State: Some Lessons from the Defeat
of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,” (paper submitted for the International Conference on the
Work of Karl Marx and Challenges for the 21st Century, Havana, Cuba, May 5 – 8, 2003), 4; available,
www.bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.
23
Ibid, 4; Andre Drainville, “International Political Economy in the Age of Open Marxism,” Review of
International Political Economy 1 no. 1 (Spring 1994): 105 – 132.
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Together, these social forces seek to educate, negotiate, and consolidate a neoliberal form
of hegemony within the conceptualization of Palestinian state formation. While
capitalism has historically been directed by elite social forces, it is important to remember
that capitalism is an on-going, contested process, that co-opts some and marginalizes
others along its historical trajectory.
I will apply a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework to the work of international
institutions in Palestinian state formation because this allows for an analysis of various
social forces between the national and international levels and the contested terrain over
which hegemony is negotiated. The neo-Gramscian conception of hegemony and the role
of international institutions in a hegemonic project apply to activities of international
institutions in the Palestinian territories, specifically through neoliberal policy
prescriptions and international development projects. A final point in conceptualizing
neoliberalism as an integrated element in the construction of hegemony and world order
is to take seriously the claim by Wendy Larner that “without analyses of the „messy
actualities‟ of particular neo-liberal projects, those working within this analytic run the
risk of precisely the problem they wish to avoid – that of producing generalized accounts
of historical epochs.”24 It is the “messy actualities” of a particular neoliberal project
within an approaching world order – Palestinian state formation – that this study analyzes
through a neo-Gramcian approach.

24

Larner, 14.
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1.4 Significance of Topic
Assessing the role of international institutions in shaping the concept of a Palestinian
state is important for a number of reasons. First, international institutions play a large role
in developing states, particularly those that arise from conflict or are transitioning toward
capitalist development from a former state-based mode of production. In the view of
international institutions, developing, emerging, and/or transitional states and economies
are in need of assistance to bring them in line with established international neoliberal
norms and practices. Although denied sovereignty to date, the Palestinian territories are
not immune to the prescriptions and logic of international institutions. Quite uniquely,
Palestinians have been subject to neoliberal recommendations and logic of international
institutions prior to state formation. The case of Palestine is unique in the regard that
Palestinians seek national liberation from a settler-colonial state and occupation during a
historical moment that is different from most other national liberation movements. 25 It is
a time when the politics of state formation and a potentially emerging state are wrapped
up in the neoliberal political economy of an emerging world order. International
institutions are actively involved in this process and have had a direct role in the
Palestinian state building project by supporting institutional development of the PA
pseudo-state apparatus and other development projects and recommending policies that
ensure neoliberal values in the configuring and conceptualization of state formation.
Second, international institutions have power in a dialectical relationship with
nation-states. The current dynamic is one of interconnection and integration, particularly

25

Jamil Hilal, “Problematizing Democracy in Palestine,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and
the Middle East 23 no. 1 & 2 (2003): 170.
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through finance, investment, trade, and communications. Economic relations are
increasingly integrated, although regulated by the institutions that were established
during uneven core-periphery capitalist development “that reflect the broader US-led
system of strategic alliances.”26 Furthermore, increasing integration through international
and global institutional arrangements, such as the G-8 and WTO are making independent
policy formulation very difficult on the national level. Because international institutions
have power, they represent and serve the interests of dominant social and economic
forces. In this arrangement, international institutions play a key role in representing and
recreating dominant social forces, in terms of hegemonic nation-states (the US) and
internally on their own terms.27 In this way, international institutions play an active role
in the creation and maintenance of international rules, norms, practices, etc. In their own
right, as important actors in world order, international institutions require in-depth
analysis from a range of perspectives.
Lastly, as will be shown in the literature review that follows, there has been a
recurring dynamic in analyzing the potential for Palestinian state formation. This
dynamic tends either to analyze how or why a Palestinian state has not formed to date, or
analyses of what is needed to create a viable Palestinian state in the future. Too often, an
analysis of what is presently being formed in Palestine (along with the how and why of
this particular formation), is sidelined for the benefit of hindsight or hopeful notions
about the future. A neo-Gramscian approach is helpful in this endeavor because the
perspective allows for investigation of various social forces irrespective of the formation
26

Paola Subacchi, “New Power Centers and New Power Brokers: Are They Shaping a New Economic
Order?” International Affairs 84 no. 3 (2008): 497.
27
Robert Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1987), 252.
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of a formal state or not. Since the state is not a necessary variable in utilizing a neoGramscian approach, the perspective lends itself to more accurate analysis of the current
dynamics in the Palestinian territories through international and domestic social forces,
that is the establishment of the neoliberal condition in Palestine without the formation of
a formal state.
1.5 Chapter Outline
My argument is outlined as follows. In chapter 2, I review the literature on my thesis
topic by pointing to the positive contributions of scholars and reiterating a gap in the
literature in applying a neo-Gramscian approach to the case of Palestinian state
formation. Chapters 3 and 4 comprise the body of my argument by showcasing how
international institutions configure social forces in the Palestinian territories to ensure
neoliberal values and development in conceptualizing a Palestinian state. Chapter 3
focuses on the Oslo process (1993 – 2000) and Chapter 4 deals with the post-Oslo phase
that spans to the present. Each chapter discusses the main ways that international
institutions permeate domestic Palestinian political economy, i.e. policy
recommendations and development projects, to shape the concept of a Palestinian state
and economy toward the neoliberal ideological thrust of an emanating world order. I
conclude my thesis with a review of my findings, as illustrated throughout the paper, and
emphasize that Palestine‟s conceptualization will continue to be rooted in the
development of the neoliberal condition as long as a political process that would lead to
Palestinian self-determination and an end the conflict is not pursued.

18

Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature
Edward Said has been one of the most prominent scholars in promoting Palestinian selfdetermination and critically approaching the role of Israel, Palestinians, and the
international community in their efforts toward that end. From The Question of Palestine
(1979) to The End of the Peace Process (2000), Said consistently and forcefully argued
that Palestinians were dispossessed from their homeland when the state of Israel was
established in 1948 and were persistently denied their inalienable right to selfdetermination.28 He did this by often invoking historical narrative to support his claims
and sharing his own experiences as a Palestinian refugee and the plight of the Palestinian
Diaspora through their quest for national identity and liberation. Said emphasized that
Israel‟s relationship with the Palestinians, ambivalent Arab regimes in the region, and
elite Palestinians willing to sell-out the Palestinian national cause contributed to the
continued failure of peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and made
justice for Palestinians more elusive. The persistent and thorough critique of dominant
social forces along with Said‟s compelling use of historical narrative toward his claims
has arguably placed him among the most prolific and influential writer for any scholar of
Palestine.
Following in the vein of Said, scholars of Palestine have often focused on the
challenges facing Palestinians and their plight toward statehood. There has been an
overarching emphasis on structures and processes that have failed to solve the question of
Palestine. A dominant thrust in reading the failure of conceptualizing Palestine is blamed
28

Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979) and The End of
the Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York: Vintage, 2000).
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on the problematic nature of the Oslo Accords, and the process more generally. Said was
one of the first and most vocal critics of the Oslo Accords. Three of Said‟s books during
the Oslo process: The Politics of Dispossession, Peace and its Discontents, and The End
of the Peace Process were highly critical of the Oslo Accords, particularly of the social
forces that served to benefit from the unjust nature of the Accords – Israel, the
international community, and prominent Palestinians.29 He posited that the Accords
would have few positive effects for Palestinians in the Palestinian territories and further
dismembered the Palestinian national cause by ignoring Palestinians in Israel and those in
the Diaspora, mostly refugees. In their perpetual quest for justice and self-determination,
Said argued that Palestinians were moving further away from that prospect.
Critics of the Oslo process argue that Oslo was problematic for a number of
reasons, of which all agree that the outcome has not been positive for a majority of
Palestinians, despite various interpretations of what went wrong in the process. For
instance, Leila Farsakh emphasizes that economic viability of a Palestinian state
minimally requires Palestinian sovereignty over lands occupied in 1967, free movement
and access between Palestinian territories, and clear, defined borders of a Palestinian
state.30 According to Farsakh, the failure to address these issues in the Accords led to
legal, territorial, and economic effects of a system similar to Bantustans created under

29

Edward Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969 –
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Leila Farsakh, “Economic Viability of a Palestinian Ste in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Is it Possible
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South African apartheid.31 Furthermore, she argues that the Al-Aqsa intifada was a
rejection of the Oslo process and its economic premise.32 Joel Beinin‟s “Pax Americana”
thesis argues that the Oslo Accords represent the regional and international balance of
power, primarily through Israel‟s regional military superiority and alliance with the
United States.33 According to this point of view, the so-called special relationship, or
more accurately termed strategic alliance, between the US and Israel is the main
impediment to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a political
settlement. He asserts that the Oslo process was part of a larger US plan to maintain
hegemony in the region after the victory in the 1991 Gulf War. According to Beinin,
alliances in the new Middle East were based on “enhanced capital investment, access to
regional markets, and expanded opportunities for profit.”34 Beinin made a strong case that
the underlying nature of the Accords – that of US strategy to maintain dominance through
neoliberal peace dividends – prevented the potential to actually establish a Palestinian
state.
Yoav Peled claims that Oslo was not a failed peace process, but rather a failed
attempt at partial decolonization.35 Peled suggests that the Oslo process was part of a
larger liberalization thrust within Israeli society, and that neoliberal peace and
privatization are causally connected. Similar to Benin, Peled believes the Oslo process
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was part of a larger neoliberal thrust throughout the region and world. However, his
outlook focuses more particularly on how Israeli elite social forces embraced
neoliberalism and the potential for peace dividends through the Accords with the
Palestinians to accumulate capital more efficiently in an increasingly integrated global
economy. Not entirely different, Peter Lagerquist argues in “Privatizing the Occupation,”
that the Oslo process and the neoliberal development opportunities it purported were
simply the result of colonial prerogatives in the current context of globalization.36 In
addition, Adel Samara in “Globalization, the Palestinian Economy, and the „Peace
Process‟ ” argues that adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the Palestinian
territories has led to a form of “development” that does not serve the majority of the
Palestinian population.37 Rather, the focus on neoliberal development during the Oslo
process has been the result of international (including Israeli) and Palestinian social
forces collaborating for the purposes of capital accumulation, rather than a political
settlement or the creation of a viable Palestinian state.
Even before the Oslo process, materialist considerations played an important role
in explaining why Palestinian state formation has not yet taken place. Sara Roy, a leading
scholar on the political economy of the Gaza Strip, argues that an uneven economic
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians has systematically distorted and
prevented a productive economic base for a viable Palestinian economy. Instead, the
result of Israel‟s political and ideological objectives has been a persistent de-development
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of the Palestinian economy.38 She argues that while the conflict and occupation of
Palestine are political in nature, they have negative economic effects that undoubtedly
play a role in Palestinian development and state building.39
More recent work has focused upon the role of aid in the Palestinian territories, and
how that role affects Palestinian state formation. Immediately following the Oslo process,
Rex Brynen‟s study of the mechanics and difficulties of international assistance to
Palestinians emphasized the negative and positive role of aid in developing the PA and in
the peace process more generally.40 However, as the decade progressed and Brynen
analyzed the politics of aid through the course of the second intifada, he became
increasingly critical of international donors and their usage of aid in the Palestinian
territories. In his more recent work, “Aid as Carrot, Aid as Stick,” Brynen argues that aid
cannot change the failures of the peace process or substitute for the political process that
is necessary to build a Palestinian state.41 A number of authors have pointed to the
problematic role international assistance has played on the ground in the Palestinian
territories, namely by ignoring the political context that makes aid necessary.42 The theme
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throughout this body of work contends that international aid has prevented the
development of a Palestinian state by legitimizing and subsidizing the Israeli occupation
of Palestinian territories. Ann LeMore argues that realities on the ground are
incompatible with a state building project and that the international community is funding
the demise of a Palestinian state as long as aid accommodates Israeli occupation rather
than challenging those policies.43
It has also been suggested that the realization of Palestine has failed due to
Palestinian governance related issues, of which Palestinians may have very little control
according to some scholars. Instead of unequal peace agreements, uneven economic
relations, or the problematic role of international assistance, this point of view holds that
Palestinian political factors must be considered in understanding the reasons Palestine has
failed to form. An anthology titled, State Formation in Palestine edited by Mushtaq Khan
considers how corruption, rent-seeking and democratic weaknesses within the PA have
potentially continued the conflict with Israel and prevented the formation of a Palestinian
state.44 The authors conclude that not all corruption is necessarily harmful for state
formation. They assert that political rents are pervasive in all developing countries and if
managed appropriately can play a positive role in economic transitioning and political
stability.
Another thrust in this body of work argues that the PA, through the leadership of
Yasir Arafat and Fatah, brought an authoritarian style of leadership to governance in the
43
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Palestinian territories, which has prevented the development of a Palestinian state.
Focusing on the PLO and its transformation into the PA, Glen Robinson argues in
Building a Palestinian State that a disconnect between the popular movement created
during the first intifada and the authoritarian tendencies of the PLO as it morphed into the
PA diminished the prospects for viable Palestinian state formation.45 Similarly,
Countdown to Statehood by Hillel Frisch, is a comparative analysis of the Palestinian
state building project with that of Zionism and the establishment of Israel.46 His study
leads him to conclude that Palestinians face far more challenges in building a state than
those experienced by Zionists. He considers the decisions facing the PLO given their
placement in the Diaspora prior to the Oslo process and suggests the PLO leadership
chose tight control from the outside. When the PLO was brought under the new rubric of
the PA during the Oslo process, the previous decisions of the PLO were transposed onto
the Palestinian territories, which created a “neopatrimonial” system of governance in the
Palestinian territories.
Yezid Sayigh agrees that PLO decision making prior to the Oslo Accords led to
an authoritarian style of leadership during the Oslo process, but his research places more
emphasis on the relationship between armed struggle and state formation in Palestine.47
Despite the eventual governance style, he argues that armed struggle was important for
the Palestinian national cause because it allowed for the creation of institutions and a
political elite, which according to Sayigh are the basis of government. Despite the fact
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that armed struggle has not liberated Palestine, Sayigh concludes that this form of
resistance did play an important role in developing the foundations for a potential
Palestinian state in the future. Sayigh‟s later work, however, reveals a shift from the
potential for Palestinian statehood to severe skepticism of this prospect. In “Inducing a
Failed State in Palestine” Sayigh argues that the Palestinian territories represent all the
conditions of state collapse due to the continued impact of international intervention,
which inhibits the ability for adequate domestic governance through the PA.48
Moving from explicating why a Palestinian state has failed to materialize,
neoliberal institutional analyses from the World Bank, IMF, and other international
institutions focus on prescriptions of what is needed, in the current moment, for Palestine
to form as a (neoliberal) state. According to international financial and development
organizations, any potential Palestinian state should have an open economy that is driven
by private sector growth and integrated into regional and global markets through
competitive goods and services.49 This would enable an environment that is conducive to
the accumulation of capital for various social forces (domestic and international), which
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is facilitated through a policy framework of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.
According to the neoliberal institutionalist approach, prolonged conflict has created
structural impairments such as persistent unemployment, dependency on Israel and
international aid, political instability, and lacking legal protection for private property
that are in need of adjustment for Palestine to economically recover and become a state.50
In the case of trade, scholars disagree on the exact shape of the preferable trade regime
for a potential Palestinian state, although there is a consensus surrounding the importance
of trade liberalization and expansion in harmonizing Palestinian trade policies with
neoliberal practices in an emerging world order.51 Furthermore, the neoliberal
instituionalist approach calls for public sector reform and good governance in the
Palestinian territories through institutional capacity building, fiscal discipline, and the
encouragement of policies that support trade and private investment.
Despite the positive contributions of various scholars considering why or how
Palestine has failed to form, there are few analytical tools available in these approaches
for investigating the relationship between international institutions and the
conceptualization of Palestine in our current moment. A neo-Gramscian approach can
bridge the analytical gap in relation to international institutions and Palestinian state
formation because the perspective allows for a more flexible analysis of state formation
through the configuration of domestic and international social forces. 52 I will utilize a
neo-Gramscian approach as developed by Cox to investigate this relationship because it
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is the most useful perspective for organizing the structures and processes, i.e. the
dynamic linkages between international institutions and social forces in the configuration
of conceptualizing a neoliberal state in Palestine. Hegemony, as reinterpreted by Cox, is a
centerpiece for understanding world order, meaning a neoliberal-influenced emerging
world order and the corresponding processes that internationalize the state. Exploring
international institutions as dynamic forces in the schema of conceptualizing Palestinian
state formation allows for simultaneous conceptualization of producer and product of
hegemony in domestic (Palestinian) and international political economy. Although
hegemony is not singularly expressed or created in international institutions, it is an
important mechanism in the process of institutionalization that creates norms, values, and
rules in world order. In this way, a neo-Gramscian lens allows for the locations of
structures and agents in the Palestinian territories that are configuring social forces
toward a conceptualization of Palestine that is neoliberal in nature.
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Chapter 3 – The Oslo Accords: International Institutions Create a
Framework for Conceptualizing Palestinian Neoliberal State Formation
(1993 – 2000)
3.1 The Oslo Context
The Oslo Accords were bilateral agreements between the government of Israel and the
PLO that were brokered with the assistance of Norway. The Accords were based on
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 242, the so-called land for peace
formula, and UNSC resolution 338. The Oslo Accords consisted of the Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, otherwise known as the
Declaration of Principles (DOP) or Oslo I along with an Interim Agreement or Oslo II
that included the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of
Power and Responsibilities, and the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the West Bank and
Gaza.53 Additionally, the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron was signed
in January 1997 and in October 1998, the Wye River Memorandum was signed at the
White House in Washington D.C., between Israel and the PLO.54 The Accords ended five
years of the first Palestinian uprising or intifada that represented many Palestinian
frustrations as a result of Israeli military occupation and were cast as “interim”
agreements that would eventually lead to a political settlement through final status
negotiations. However, the Oslo Accords were agreements between two unequal parties,
where one country was large, advanced, sovereign, and historically assisted in its
53
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development (Israel); the other being small, not sovereign or developed, and only
recently financially assisted (Palestinian territories). Asymmetrical power dynamics and a
number of design flaws prohibited the Oslo Accords from transforming the IsraeliPalestinian conflict into anything beyond interim agreements.
The Accords themselves represent an international institution in that both parties
agreed to the terms and accepted them as binding (at least in theory) and were supported
by the international community. However, international support for agreements that
clearly favor an industrialized, sovereign state over stateless indigenous peoples
perpetuates the colonial relationship that Israel and its supporters bring to the
conceptualization of Palestinian state formation. Specifically, the structure and terms of
the Accords, and the Oslo process more generally prevented the actual formation of a
Palestinian state by focusing instead on conceptualizing state formation through a
framework of neoliberal policy prescriptions and development projects. This obviated the
context of Israeli occupation and allowed Israel to further institutionalize its occupation
in the Palestinian territories.55
As part of the Accords, the Palestinian territories were divided into three groups;
Palestinians were allowed a limited amount of “self-rule” over a small percentage of
territory in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In Area A, Palestinians were in control of civil
administration and security, Area B was a mix of Palestinian civil administration and
Israeli security control, while Israel retained full control of both civil administrative and
security matters in Area C.56 Area C amounted to 59 percent of the West Bank, while
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Israel retained security control over an additional 23.8 percent in Area B. In total, Israel
controlled 82.8 percent of the West Bank, while Palestinians were only in full control of
the remaining 17.2 percent.57 Areas A and B, of which Palestinians maintained minimal
control, comprised the major Palestinian population centers in the territories, but only
formed a small percentage of surface land, while Area C comprised a majority of the
territory, was contiguous, and surrounded Areas A and B.58
The Palestinian territories were further fragmented during the Oslo process by the
rapid increase in the Israeli settler population. During the Oslo process, Israeli settlers in
the Palestinian territories increased by over 50 percent from 240,000 in 1993 to 380,000
by 2000.59 The Accords were very clear on maintaining Israeli territorial integrity in
Area C and protecting the private property rights of Israelis in Palestinian controlled
areas, although made no similar protections for Palestinians.60 The customs union (CU)
formed under the “Protocol on Economic Relations” (Paris Protocol 1994) in Annex V
especially represented the larger dynamic of the agreements that ultimately gave Israel far
more power and rights than those assigned to the PA. The Paris Protocol reinstated a
quasi CU between Israel and the Palestinian territories that had been essentially in effect
since Israel‟s occupation of the territories in 1967.61 Because of structural constraints
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built into the CU, economic viability for a future Palestinian state was severely curtailed.
Trade was liberalized by applying a common external tariff, which was structured
according to the Israeli economy and Israeli trade policy. As a developed country with
one of the highest VAT rates in the world, Israel protected its own industry by not
exposing it to the competition a less developed country could offer in a global economy.
In addition, a revenue clearance system was created as a part of the CU, whereby
Israel collects taxes on behalf of the PA on goods imported through Israel whose final
destination is the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Israel then remits these taxes back to the PA,
which in turn provides a major source of revenue for the Authority. While a quasi CU
existed prior to the Oslo process, the revenue clearance system was a specific feature of
the Accords. Israel periodically uses its administrative role as transmitter of taxes for
political and economic reasons. This happens when Israel withholds VAT and customs
duties or uses the revenue to pay for Israeli services provided to Palestinians.62 Because
the Paris Protocol institutionalized economic integration, the PA had very limited space
to create its own policies and was restricted primarily to expenditure allocation.
Terms of the Accords permitted Israel to consolidate its control over its external
borders and those within the West Bank. The DOP maintained Israel‟s control of internal
and external security and delegated Palestinian foreign relations to final status
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negotiations.63 This allowed Israel to implement closure within and from the Palestinian
territories, justified by Israel for security reasons and authorized by the international
community. Closure, or the restriction of movement and access, has become a permanent
fixture in the Palestinian territories since the Oslo process. It began as an elaborate permit
and license plate system that dictated who could travel in and between certain areas and
has expanded since Oslo to include other facets such as the separation wall that Israel
began constructing in 2002.64
Closure over the Palestinian territories works internally and externally by
preventing movement of goods and people. It can be partial with some movement
disrupted or total, where all movement and access is completely halted. Internal closure
prevents movement within the West Bank through an extensive system of checkpoints,
roadblocks, earth mounds, and other barriers to free movement. External closure prevents
movement to and from Israel from the Palestinian territories or between the Gaza Strip
and West Bank.65 Finally, external closure prevents movement or access to the outside
world from the West Bank to Jordan or from the Gaza Strip to Egypt. Between 1993 –
1996, closure and permits cost an estimated $2.8 billion, which was double the amount of
aid disbursed to the Palestinians during this time.66 In addition, Israel imposed 443 days
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of closure, averaging 90 days per year between 1994 and 1999.67 Since the status of East
Jerusalem was put off for final status negotiations, it remained permanently closed to
Palestinians in other parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The economic integration structured into the Paris Protocol made the Palestinian
economy even more vulnerable to closure as Palestinian goods and labor waited for
checkpoints to open at the discretion of Israel. Trade and regular employment were
frequently disrupted and thus unemployment increased. The nature of the Accords
provided very little space for Palestinians to create independent policy and created a
pseudo-legal rubric for segmenting Palestinian territory and dislocating communities into
semi-autonomous cantons, which prevented a uniform base for Palestinian political and
economic relations. This led to redundant political institutions and segmented economic
activity. Implementing the Oslo Accords led to the de facto fragmentation of Palestinian
territories, thereby preventing economic viability in the areas under limited Palestinian
self-rule and the prospect for an economically viable Palestinian state in the future. In this
way, the Oslo Accords institutionalized Israeli occupation, which further dismembered
Palestine and imprinted an Israeli-colonial vision for a potential state. International
institutions supported these processes and ignored the context of Israeli occupation,
focusing instead on configuring a neoliberal notion of state formation by ideologically
ensuring neoliberal values through policy recommendations and development projects in
the Palestinian territories.
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3.2 International Institutions and Palestinian State Formation during the Oslo
Process
The Oslo Accords became a juncture for international institutions to promote a neoliberal
framework for political and economic development in conceptualizing a Palestinian state.
With the signing of the Oslo Accords, a large influx of international organizations came
to the Palestinian territories for the first time. The organizations ranged from state-based
development agencies to international development and financial institutions. The
number of international organizations and range of activities they were involved in was
unprecedented for the Palestinian territories and a major indication of wide-ranging
support for the internationally brokered Accords. Major international financial
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank came for the first time to the Palestinian
territories, creating country offices, allocating budgets for country specific research and
development projects, and employing local and foreign employees. Importantly, Palestine
is not a formal member of most international organizations that are state-based in their
membership given that Palestine as a sovereign state does not exist. As such, the
willingness of international organizations to come to the territories despite this actuality
is unique and indicative of their desire to be involved in configuring neoliberal conditions
in the Palestinian territories.
The World Bank in particular has played an important role in the Palestinian
territories since negotiations between Israel and PLO began in the early 1990s. The
United States and Russia asked the Bank to participate in the Madrid conference in 1991,
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as assistant to the chair in three multilateral working groups.68 When the Oslo Accords
were signed, the Bank took on an extensive role in the territories, with some of its
activities in line with its traditional role in other developing countries, and a number of
activities outside its established purview. As in other developing countries, the Bank
finances development projects and seeks to harmonize domestic policies with established
rules, norms, and practices in an emerging neoliberal world order.
This is done primarily through monitoring and prioritizing macroeconomic
domestic policies and supporting domestic social forces whose ideological leanings are
mutually agreeable to consolidate national hegemony. The IMF also has an important,
albeit slightly different role, in the Palestinian territories. Since the IMF became involved
in the territories in the early 1990s is has worked closely with the PA, the Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA),
mainly on public sector institutional development, management, and reform. Through
technical assistance, economic analysis, and policy advice, the IMF provides the PA with
part of the means for creating a neoliberal policy framework and good governance
practices in PA institutions.
International institutions viewed a political settlement as necessary but not
required for economic development in the Palestinian territories.69 Efforts to separate
political and economic variables, particularly through the Bank‟s attempt to create
“closure-proof trade routes” around industrial estates and free zones are one such
68
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example.70 International institutions tried to deemphasize Israeli occupation and
depoliticize the realities of the Oslo process by focusing on neoliberal policy
recommendations and donor-funded development projects. This was frustrating for
international institutions such as the World Bank as they were given a mandate to enable
an investor-friendly environment, yet had no institutional or political capabilities to work
on the structural features that created the conditions for an unfriendly investment
environment in the Palestinian territories.71
During this time, development discourse began to play a much larger role in
Palestinian political economy. The basic vision for political and economic neoliberal
development purported that market-driven private sector growth and government
downsizing were the driving forces in transforming underdeveloped states. At the time, a
“laundry list” of recommendations was supported in vastly different parts of the world to
allegedly bring the world‟s poorest nations to a state of development reached by
advanced, wealthy states. As such, attempts to consolidate a neoliberal notion of
Palestinian state formation during the Oslo process were “conducted under the hegemony
of the ideology of economic liberalization, privatization, and „structural
adjustment‟…with effective powerful global institutions (economic, communicational,
and financial) demanding a redefinition of state sovereignty that facilitates the free flow
of capital and commodities on a world scale...”72 Although Palestinian statehood was put
off until a later date pending final status agreements, the participation of the international
community played a vital role in promoting political and economic neoliberalism during
70
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the Oslo process. International institutions ideologically ensure neoliberal values in
conceptualizing Palestinian state formation through policy recommendations and
development projects.
3.2.1 Policy Recommendations
Policy recommendations to Palestinians during the Oslo process were consistent with
those recommended in other parts of the world at that time. The ideological discourse of
neoliberalism in general called for trade liberalization, private sector driven economic
growth, and public sector reform through good governance principals in the Palestinian
territories. In the case of trade, international institutions disagree on the exact shape of the
preferable trade regime in the Palestinian territories (whether it should be a CU, free trade
or non-discriminatory trade agreement), although there is a consensus surrounding the
importance of trade liberalization and expansion in harmonizing Palestinian trade policies
with existing norms and practices in an emerging world order.
The World Bank focused on three major policy areas during the Oslo process.
These included the benefits of private sector investment, economic liberalization, and
independent macroeconomic policy, especially the possibility of a Palestinian currency. 73
Two weeks after the Oslo Accords were signed by Israel and the PLO the World Bank
issued a comprehensive six volume report titled, “Developing the Occupied Palestinian
Territories: An investment in Peace.” The study emphasized the structural dislocations in
the Palestinian economy and called for policies that would support private-sector growth,
export promotion, improvement of infrastructure and service delivery, and diversification
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of future trade relations.74 The extensive nature of the volume and speed of its production
raised some suspicion about the policy agendas of international institutions, and the Bank
in particular. According to one of its own evaluation reports, the Bank notes, “The
concomitant timing of publication of the report led some observers to wonder at the
amazing speed and efficiency of the Bank, and other observers with a more conspiratorial
turn of mind to infer that the Bank had somehow been appraised of the secret Oslo
negotiations.”75 From the perspective of international organizations, the report became
the blueprint for policy prescriptions and development in the Palestinian territories during
the Oslo process.76
Good governance was encouraged through public management, fiscal discipline,
and a policy framework that supported trade and investment. According to the World
Bank, developing the private sector in Palestine “requires the creation of a legal and
regulatory environment that supports private sector initiative. The legal system should
provide a set of rules that govern property rights, their exchange and settlement of
disputes…”77 The IMF primarily assisted in formulating fiscal, banking, trade, and
potential monetary policies for the PA. Similar to the World Bank, they emphasized in
1995 “the need for a strategy which is outward looking, led by the private sector, and able
to promote sizeable nondebt credit private capital inflows for investment in productive,
labor-intensive activities.”78
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During the Oslo process, the PLO did sign several trade agreements in an effort to
bolster the PA and show the international community its readiness to be good trading
partner in the world economy. This allowed Palestinian exports duty-free access to the
US, Canada, EU, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Arab Free Trade
Association (AFTA), and Turkey. 79 However, the agreements were only effective for
Palestinian economic development insofar as Israel allowed goods to pass through its
borders or the borders it controlled in the Palestinian territories to reach the outside
world. Without this vital component in the process, Palestinian goods remained
uncompetitive in regional and global markets as their stock and transit times continued to
be unpredictable.
3.2.2 Development Projects
International organizations began to fund and plan for the future Palestinian state through
development projects in the Palestinian territories during the Oslo process. In general,
development projects work in tandem with policy prescriptions to create an enabling
environment for the configuration of international and domestic social forces to negotiate
and consolidate neoliberal values domestically and ensure those values in conceptualizing
Palestinian state formation. Development projects focus on sectors such as education,
health care, and infrastructure so that a stable environment is created for investment and
production. The major actors involved in development projects include the major
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international development and financial organizations such as the World Bank, IMF,
various UN agencies, the EC, etc. along with individual state-based international
development agencies (USAID, JICA, etc.).
While the activities of each organization take on different sectoral priorities, all
development projects support a Palestinian state building project that coincides with the
rules, norms, and practices of a neoliberal-influenced emerging world order. The
construction of PA institutions was the focus of development during the Oslo process, as
institutional development was seen as a vital component in creating the legal and
regulatory environment necessary for neoliberal-based capital accumulation among elite
social forces. The PA provided a governance structure for limited Palestinian self-rule
over Areas A and B in West Bank and Gaza Strip. Similar to the larger thrust of the
agreements, the PA was intended to be a transitional institution with restricted power. As
such, the Authority had limited policy instruments at its disposal since in had no control
over its borders or natural resources. The Paris Protocol further reinforced these structural
limitations by integrating the Palestinian economy more into the Israeli economy than in
the past by institutionalizing single monetary and trade policies between the Palestinian
and Israeli economies.80
Aiding the development of the PA has played a dual role for donors. First,
supporting the creation of the PA and its constant reform and (re)structuring through
good governance principals has ensured a Palestinian negotiating partner for Israel on
80

The new Authority was a major political shift for Palestinians in that the PLO was the legitimized and
sole representative of the Palestinian people up to that point which included Palestinians in the diaspora, the
occupied territories, and Palestinians from 1948 residing in present day Israel. The PLO‟s importance was
demoted to make way for the burgeoning PA, which then only came to represent Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the PLO remained the formal representative of the Palestinian people in
negotiations with Israel.

41

terms agreed by the international community. Secondly, most donors believed that
institutional development of the PA apparatus to be a foundational step in building a
neoliberal environment for the ideological consolidation of social forces in the
Palestinian state formation process. Even toward the end of the decade the World Bank
was still saying “…more attention should be given to building competence within the PA,
thus ensuring a capable system of governance that fosters and complements privatesector driven growth.”81
Donors, Funding, and Aid Coordination
Coordination, management, and implementation of donor funds occurred through several
complex mechanisms that were set up following the signing of the Oslo Accords. The
international community donated over $3.4 billion to Palestinians during the Oslo
process, with a ratio of 7:1 in favor of development aid to humanitarian assistance.82
Main donors included the EC, US, World Bank, various EU countries, Japan, and Arab
states.83 The architecture of international aid during the Oslo process comprised over 40
countries, numerous UN agencies, local and international NGOs, Palestinian ministries,
and the World Bank. At the Washington Conference for multilateral talks on peace in the
Middle East in October 1993, the Multilateral Steering Group created the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee (AHLC). The AHLC consisted of 12 members and was the main body for
developing a strategic vision and policy framework for international aid in the Palestinian
81

Ali Khadr, “Donor Assistance” in Development under Adversity: The Palestinian Economy in Transition
by Ishac Diwan and Radwan Ali Shaban (Washington D.C.: IBRD/World Bank, 1999).
82
Diwan and Shaban, Development under Adversity, 143 and Yossi Alpher, “Israel‟s Aid Responsibilities
Towards the Palestinian Population” in Aid, Diplomacy, and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine
by Michael Keating, Anne LeMore, and Robert Lowe, eds. (London: Chatham House, 2005), 155.
83
MIFTAH, “Fact Sheet: The Palestinian National Authority‟s Sources of Funding,” (February 2006);
available, www.miftah.org.

42

territories. Also at the capital level, a Consultative Group (CG) was established by the
World Bank, which as in other recipient countries served as a forum to mobilize donor
pledges and discuss policy issues.
At the local level, two main bodies were initially established for coordinating
international aid: the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) and the Local Aid Coordination
Committee (LACC). The JLC was set up to encourage policy coordination among major
donors, Israel, and the PA, while the LACC served as a forum for all donors and
coordinated international funds on the ground. The LACC also liaised between the
AHLC and Sector Working Groups. Sector Working Groups were set up in 1995 as a
local forum for sector-based coordination and implementation of development projects.
As the Oslo process progressed, Israeli imposed restrictions on movement and access
increased, posing major impediments to donor-funded development project
implementation. In 1997, the JLC specially created the Task Force on Project
Implementation (TFPI) to determine ways to work around those constraints. The AHLC,
CG, JLC, LACC, TFPI, and the Sector Working Groups were all co-chaired by
international institutions (World Bank, UNSCO, EU/EC, US/USAID, Japan/JICA,
Norway) and sometimes a PA representative.
The international institutional architecture and corresponding configurations of
international and domestic elite social forces represented the penetration of international
institutions and deeply embedded nature of international intervention in Palestine‟s
development and conceptualization. The complex and extensive structures devised by the
international community to fund, coordinate, and manage neoliberal development
projects ensured Palestine‟s continued and deepening internationalization. Furthermore,
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the international institutional architecture set up after Oslo became a space for
international and domestic elite social forces to congregate and consolidate neoliberal
hegemony in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation and development.
In addition, the World Bank and leading Palestinian actors created the Palestinian
Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) in 1993 as a
mechanism for managing aid and investments, along with drafting economic policies.84
PECDAR was created because there were no public financial institutions in the
Palestinian territories that could manage and implement the development projects funded
by donor aid. The transitional rubric that Oslo operated under applied to PECDAR as
well in that its mandate was originally supposed to expire in 1996, yet still remains today.
Several PA ministries emerged from PECDAR program offices such as the office of
program formulation became the Ministry of Finance and the economic analysis office
became the Ministry of Planning.85
Trust funds were also an important mechanism for channeling donor funds to the
PA, but more importantly represented the unprecedented role the World Bank was
willing to play in setting up neoliberal conditions in the Palestinian territories. Since the
Palestinian territories are not a member country of the Bank, the Bank devised new
institutional mechanisms that were extraordinary at the time and allowed the Bank to
pursue neoliberal development projects on the ground. While numerous funds have been
created since the Oslo process, the most important during that time was the Holst Fund
(1994 – 2001), as it was the main way to channel funds to the development of PA
institutions. The Holst Fund provided financing for three components of PA institutional
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development: 1) recurrent budget support (initially only for a couple ministries but by
1995 had broadened to include financing for almost all PA central administration salaries,
operations and maintenance expenses), 2) job creation, and 3) micro-projects. The
purpose of the Fund exemplified the way international donors were willing to fund
institutional development to create an environment for capital accumulation and
institutionalize a neoliberal conception of Palestine.
Through the various funding and implementation mechanisms discussed above,
the PA was a product of international institutionalization of the neoliberal project in
Palestinian governance and institution building. Prior to the Oslo process, public
Palestinian institutions did not exist in the Palestinian territories, and during the Oslo
process, Israel would only allow Palestinian institutional development within the context
of a peace process (i.e. with international oversight and consent given by Israel).86
Separation between the Gaza Strip and West Bank led to inefficiency and duplication of
institutions and the complete disconnect from East Jerusalem prevented any cohesion in
Palestinian national institutions. Because the PA was a construction of international
institutions and was limited by external constraints of occupation, the Authority had
limited policymaking capacity. As the PA was a creation of the international community,
it expectedly was dependent on international institutions for policy formulation.
Particularly, the PA was dependent on economic policies that would guide the pseudostate apparatus toward the domestic consolidation of hegemony with neoliberal values
ensured by the social forces that were brought into the construction of the PA.
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Industrial Estates
All projects through international institutions enable an environment for neoliberal
development in some fashion; however, the most glaring reflection during the Oslo
process was the creation of a free zones and industrial estates program. Industrial estates
and free zones are specially designated customs and duty-free, export-processing zones
that aim to attract foreign investment and facilitate joint ventures. They facilitate capital
accumulation by creating enclaves of small-scale investor friendly environments (low
cost labor, tax exemptions, few environmental regulations, advanced infrastructure, etc.)
that guarantee few protections for local workers and the environment, but promise profits
for international and domestic elite social forces. In the Palestinian territories, the
industrial estates program represented a larger dynamic in the relationship between
international institutions and Palestinian state formation during the Oslo process. The
industrial estates were important development projects for international institutions that
tried to isolate political variables from economic variables because they were an attempt
to create “closure-free zones.” The idea that development could proceed in isolated
enclaves, while ignoring the larger political context of military occupation mimicked the
larger thrust of international support for the Oslo process that ignored the necessity of a
political process that would lead to a political settlement and a Palestinian state.
The economic justification for the development of industrial estates in the
Palestinian territories was that they would solve the persistent problem of Palestinian
unemployment, build confidence and mutual trust through economic linkages with Israeli
businesses, and integrate the Palestinian economy into global markets. The “Law for
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Industrial Estates and Free Zones” and the “Law on the Encouragement of Investment”
provided the main legal framework for establishing industrial estates and made clear that
all incentives, exemptions and privileges were offered to investors regardless of
nationality. The industrial estates encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering
financial incentives and exemptions such as: goods imported and exported, profits
earned, and buildings constructed were all exempt from customs duties and taxes. Capital
invested, income generated, and foreign currencies could all be freely transferred and
repatriated to home countries.87
With the assistance of international institutions, particularly the World Bank, the
Palestinian Industrial Estates and Free Zones Authority (PIEFZA) was created during the
Oslo process, which allowed for a legal rubric for implementing industrial estates and
free zones along the Green Line. PIEFZA managed the industrial estates and free zones
program and provided “one stop shop” services for investors by coordinating all permits
and licenses needed with relevant government agencies to begin production in the
industrial estates. The entire concept of industrial estates and free zones in the Palestinian
territories – where neoliberal policies and purported economic development could
flourish in isolated enclaves permitted by Israel – further institutionalized the very nature
of the Oslo Accords and the subsequent process that became infamous for cantonizaton
and foreign control.
Before the Oslo process, Israel had established one industrial estate slightly north
of the Gaza Strip called the Erez Industrial Estate (EIE). After the Oslo Accords were
signed, the Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade, Natan Sharansky, and World Bank
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President, James Wolfensohn, sought to revive and expand the industrial estates
program.88 The GIE was the first and only operational industrial estate established during
the Oslo process. The industrial estate was equipped with advanced infrastructure and
service centers for conducting business. Nine other industrial estates were planned during
the Oslo process, but none were launched during that time. Not coincidentally, the
industrial estate was ceremonially opened in December 1998 when US President Bill
Clinton visited the Gaza Strip. President Clinton cut the ribbon at the then standing Gaza
Airport and US Commerce Secretary, William Daley, did the same at the GIE site.89 The
primary investors (elite social forces) in the GIE were the World Bank, USAID,
European Investment Bank, Palestine Development and Investment Ltd. (PADICO), and
the government of Israel. USAID, whose main function is a procurement agency for US
firms in the Palestinian territories, contracted a number of companies such as The
Services Group (now AECOM International Development), The Berger Group, and
Chemonics to design and build infrastructure and install high-tech scanners so that Israel
would accept the goods as safe for export.90 Each of these private international
development firms has development projects such as the construction of export
processing zones in other “emerging markets.”
Industrial estates were an important mechanism for merging local social and
economic forces led by the private sector in the Palestinian territories and Israel with the
neoliberal ideological logic and international social forces of international institutions.
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PADICO (among others) became representative of the new Palestinian elite social forces
that were arranging themselves in the contested neoliberal process of conceptualizing
Palestinian state formation.91 International estates also became “vehicles for transmitting
the global market discipline to the domestic economy” and a space for international
institutions to have influence over Palestinian economic relations with Israel and the rest
of the world.92 They were packaged as a model for economic development and a conduit
for Palestinian economic integration into the global economy, similar to export
processing zones in other developing countries. Seen as “closure-proof,” the industrial
estates and free zone program not only attempted to ignore the context of Israeli
occupation, but further refashion the impediments of economic development as an
opportunity to globalize.93 However, production in industrial estates was not for domestic
consumption and as such had few linkages with the rest of the economy. They did not
prove to be effective engines of economic growth as there were few “spillover” effects
into the domestic Palestinian economy. Finally, industrial estates were quickly relegated
from any notion of “closure proof” as the IDF frequently interfered with site development
and imposed closure when the al-Aqsa intifada began in 2000.
3.3 Summary
The terms and structure of the Oslo Accords clearly favored Israel and its state
expansionist goals through various mechanisms such as its unilateral right to impose
closure over discountiguous Palestinian enclaves while simultaneously expanding its
91

Lagerquist, 12.
Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development
(Hong Kong: MacMillian, 1997), 134.
93
Lagerquist, 14.
92

49

population in Palestinian territories. Israel defends its right to prevent movement and
access through the use of checkpoints or closure more generally in the name of temporary
security measures, however, the regularity and extent of these mechanisms go far beyond
justifiable security concerns. Since the Oslo process, movement and access restrictions
have been widespread and consistent, thus representing an institutionalized policy of
closure since that time. Furthermore, the CU and revenue-clearance system as part of the
Paris Protocol privileged Israel‟s economy and made PA funding partly dependent on
Israel‟s willingness to remit money back to the Palestinians. Israeli occupation was
institutionalized during the Oslo process with the support of the international community
and these dynamics created the context from which the current inviability of Palestinian
statehood derives. While the aspirations for Oslo may have been in the spirit of
Palestinian statehood, the political and economic architecture created under its auspices
was pointed toward creating a business friendly environment and the conditions for
neoliberal-based capital accumulation in the Palestinian territories.
While international institutions had been involved in the Palestinian territories
before the 1990s, most significantly the UN and its related agencies, the Oslo process
opened the door for international intervention into the Palestinian territories. Through
policy prescriptions and donor-sponsored development projects, international institutions
have ensured neoliberal values in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation. Policy
papers and recommendations encouraged the formulation of a policy framework that
supported neoliberalism through good governance principals and market-based, investorfriendly macroeconomic policies. Institutional development and corresponding policies
provided a legal and regulatory context for tangible development projects on the ground
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in the Palestinian territories. Most notably during the Oslo process, institutional
development was supported through the burgeoning PA apparatus. Economic
development was assisted through various programs during the Oslo process, although
for purposes of this paper the establishment of an industrial estates and free zone program
was the most noteworthy. This is because of the direct economic and ideological role
they played in linking the neoliberal rules, practices, and norms of an emerging world
order with those of Palestinian economic development. In this process, international and
Palestinian social forces are brought together for the purpose of domestic consolidation of
neoliberal values in the process of conceptualizing Palestine.
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Chapter 4 – International Institutions in the Palestinian Territories in
the Post-Oslo Period (2000 – Present)
The Oslo process was problematic from the outset, as described in the previous chapter.
During the Oslo process, international institutions made clear that Palestinian economic
recovery was a three-pronged approach, whereby both Israel and the PA needed to make
reform efforts, and the international community would support each in these endeavors.
However, during the Oslo process, there was much emphasis on Palestinian institutional
development and donor funding of what was considered vital projects for laying the
foundations for conceptualizing neoliberal Palestinian state formation and economic
integration into regional and global markets. During the Oslo process, international
institutions tried to separate political and economic variables in hopes that economic
development and a burgeoning PA apparatus would downplay the political and economic
realities of Israeli occupation. Any hope surrounding the Oslo process, no matter how
false it may have been, clearly had ended by the end of the decade. Negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians failed in 2000 at Camp David and Taba, Ariel Sharon was
elected Prime Minister in Israel, and Palestinians took to the streets in 2000 in rejection
of the configuration of Palestine that favored Israeli state expansionism and neoliberal
global integration.
When the second intifada started in 2000 the Israeli military redeployed into
many villages and towns in the Palestinian territories, particularly since 2002 when the
IDF conducted “Operation Defensive Shield” and entered Areas A and B. Since that
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time, Israel controls all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.94 Even after Israel‟s
Disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the IDF still retains complete control over
its land, air, and sea, which has proven devastating since Israel‟s siege on the territory
that began in 2007. Since 2000, international organizations have increasingly diverted
funds from development to humanitarian relief. Between 2001 and 2006 developmental
assistance comprised only a little more than a quarter of total donor assistance to the
Palestinians.95 The ratio between development and humanitarian assistance was 7:1
during the Oslo process, but by 2002, the ratio practically reversed to 1:5.96 During the
second intifada donors nearly doubled aid, reaching approximately $1 billion annually.97
Since the PA was a construction and product of international intervention into
Palestinian political development, donors have desperately attempted to prevent structural
collapse of the PA and a humanitarian disaster in the Palestinian territories. Had either of
these occurred, the negligent role of Israel and the international community in ending the
conflict and implementing a political settlement that would lead to a Palestinian state
would have been clearly illuminated. Mainly, international organizations provide
humanitarian relief directly in the form of food or medical assistance or through budget
support to PA institutions and short-term employment generation schemes (primarily
within donor-funded neoliberal development projects).98 While international institutions
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initially allowed for public sector employment expansion as a response to closureinflicted unproductive private sector unemployment, they have since reigned in on this
practice. International institutions permitted this at first because it was easier than
confronting Israel for creating the conditions under which massive unemployment was
taking place. While international organizations now passively criticize Israel in their
publications, more importantly they promote policies to the PA and condition funding on
capping the public wage bill and other public sector reform measures. Following the
neoliberal mantra and ignoring the conditions of occupation, the World Bank and other
international institutions believe that support for the private sector can help the PA curtail
a growing public sector.99
In January 2006 when Hamas democratically won the PLC elections, the
international community immediately boycotted the new Palestinian government by
halting all aid and diplomatic contacts. Israel withheld clearance revenues that it was
supposed to remit back to the PA as part of the Paris Protocol, amounting to a deficit over
$1 billion. 100 Agreeing to the terms set by dominant international social forces and
mutually agreeable to local elites, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas officiated an
“emergency government” and declared Hamas an illegal authority on 17 June 2007. A
month later, the emergency government was transformed into a “caretaker government”
and was unequivocally supported by the international community. Salaam Fayyad, a UStrained economist that previously worked at the World Bank and IMF was appointed
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Prime Minister.101 Israel released 256 mostly-Fatah prisoners from Israeli jails, increased
entry permits for senior PLO officials, and started to remit some of the clearance revenue
back to the PA that it had been withholding as part of the Hamas boycott.102 The
international denouncement of democratic results in the PLC elections showed once
again the deeply embedded nature of the international community in shaping Palestinian
political development and was yet another example of the marriage between international
and domestic social forces in securing an internationally approved legal and regulatory
environment for capital accumulation. Furthermore, the configuring of domestic and
international social forces during this processes further concretized the role of
international elite social forces in conceptualizing Palestine.
At the Paris Donors Conference held in December 2007, acting Prime Minister
Salaam Fayyad presented the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) for the
years 2008 – 2010. In general, the PRDP sets out to “…reform the security sector and reestablish the rule of law, improve access to justice, move toward a more fiscally
sustainable position, improve our management of public finances, strengthen the capacity
of the public sector, and improve local governance.”103 The PRDP embodies a
comprehensive plan for neoliberal reform and development in the Palestinian territories
on a sectoral basis, as prescribed by international institutions. The PRDP is a
manifestation of Palestinian elite social forces negotiating the policies and ideology of
neoliberal-influenced world order with the process of Palestinian state formation.
According to the World Bank, “The PA‟s recognition of the need to interface with donors
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is imbedded in the PRDP preparation process, whereby PA sub-teams were created on
economic development, infrastructure, governance and social and humanitarian policy.
The setup of these teams mirrors the structure of the Local Strategy Groups,” which is
coordinated by LACS through the AHLC and Quartet.104
The PRDP economic and development policy framework represents a complete
embracement of what dominant international social forces expect from a Palestinian
government, despite its limited capabilities and resources. In creating the PRDP, the PA
stated that it held consultations with “internal stakeholders” such as the private sector and
NGOs, in addition to “external development partners” such as international financial
institutions and donors.105 The PRDP approach is based on neoliberal economic
principals and standardized with international institutional formats. For example, the
PRDP utilizes a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), as developed by the
World Bank and a Medium-Term Fiscal Framework created by UNCTAD.106 Similar to
most plans in the post-Oslo period, the PRDP is a performance based-plan with built in
mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.107
Much of the PRDP is about public expenditure control and PA fiscal
sustainability, an attempt to “slim down the PNA.”108 Complying with neoliberal dictates,
the PRDP promises to reduce the budget deficit, control the public sector wage bill,
reduce public sector employment, reform the pension system in the future, privatize
electricity distribution, improve public financial management, implement modern human
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resources management thru performance evaluations and merit-based appointments, and
introduce e-government. The PRDP embraces nearly all the policy recommendations
proffered by international institutions in the Oslo and post-Oslo periods. For instance it
says the PA will draft a Company Law, Competition Law, Land Law, Industrial Law,
Trade Law, Public Audit Law, Civil Service Law, revise the Public Finance Law, revise
the Landlord and Tenant Law, upgrade capacity of data collecting bodies (PCBS, MoF,
MoP), build capacity of the Palestinian Standards Institute (PSI), establish an electricity
regulatory body, develop the mortgage market, increase property registration, increase
exports, create an agro-industrial park (described below), establish municipal industrial
parks in Tulkarem and Hebron, and establish border industrial estates in Jenin and
Tarqumiya (described below) – all of which have been previously recommended to the
PA by international institutions.109
Not surprisingly, international institutions support the PA‟s drive to implement a
neoliberal policy framework and believe the PA has done a remarkable job at
implementing a number of the PRDP reforms. 110 Elite social forces that have been built
up through the PA (MoP and MoF in particular through pioneering of PRDP) admit,
“Reformers have difficulty countering the allegations that the reform agenda is
international, not Palestinian, lending credence to one of the most powerful arguments
advanced by resistors of reform.”111 The PRDP is a clear manifestation of domestic social
forces agreeing to terms set by international elite social forces and mutually agreeable to
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both groups for establishing a business friendly climate conducive to neoliberal capital
accumulation in the Palestinian territories.
4.2.1 Policy Recommendations
The tone of policy recommendations after the Oslo process varied little from the earlier
period. The general thrust toward the neoliberal condition remained the same as the
World Bank reiterated in the post-Oslo period, “Palestinian economic recovery will
depend on creating an export-based economy with unimpeded access to global
markets.”112 Not unlike the Oslo period, the post-Oslo phase has been heavily influenced
by policy recommendations of international institutions. Enhancing institutional capacity
to correspond more correctly with a neoliberal project continues to be a major policy
emphasis for international institutions. One World Bank publication notes, “Without
efficient customs, courts, standards institutes, statistical services and other necessary
institutions, the Palestinian private sector will not be competitive.” International
institutions prescribe the development of key institutions that promote trade such as the
Department of Customs, which according to the World Bank, needs support in entering
the World Customs Organization. 113 International institutions also recommend
establishment of the Palestinian Electricity Regulatory Council (PERC), enhancing the
Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA), and creating a credit bureau to further develop
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the legal and regulatory environment and favorable neoliberal conditions in the
Palestinian territories.114
While a number of ministries work directly with particular international
institutions on drafting general policies, certain laws have been consistently prescribed in
the post-Oslo period. Similar to aiding key institutions that support trade and investment,
the laws that international institutions recommend foster a legal framework for
neoliberal-based capital accumulation. This includes establishing competition and antimoney laundering laws, and reforming the existing electricity and pension laws to
decrease the amount of public assistance. 115 Privatization is encouraged through
contractual arrangements for private management and investment in power distribution
utilities. To harmonize Palestinian procedures and products with existing practices and
rules in neoliberal influenced emerging world order international institutions recommend
the development of the PSI to meet international standards. All PA manuals and
procedures are also encouraged to become standardized with international norms.116 The
largest change from international institutions in the post-Oslo period has not been in the
prescriptions themselves, but that international institutions started to condition
international assistance to Palestinians on reform towards those recommendations. In
2000 and 2002, the IMF was mandated by donors to provide assistance to the PA through
a range of reforms in the Economic Policy Framework and the Transparency and
Financial Accountability Support Group. More recently, the IMF works with the PA in
creating its annual budget and monitoring public sector expenditure. President Bush‟s
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Rose Garden speech in 2002 made Palestinian statehood conditional on the PA‟s ability
to strengthen governance capacity and increase fiscal transparency. During this time, the
Task Force on Palestinian Reform (TFPR) was created to implement, monitor, and
evaluate Palestinian performance towards international recommended/imposed
reforms.117 These reforms were further embodied in the 2003 Quartet sponsored
“Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict.”
A smaller, although also apparent, change in international institutions in the postOslo period appears in their critique of Israel‟s role in preventing Palestinian economic
development. The World Bank, for example, has repeatedly stated that Israeli imposed
movement and access restrictions “…go beyond concrete and checkpoints to [form] a
complex matrix of restrictive policies and administrative procedures that combine to stunt
Palestinian economic growth.” 118 Statements that identify Israeli obstacles to Palestinian
economic development and the accompanying recommendations for removing these
barriers remain baseless and decontextualized as they fall short of actually pressing Israel
to change. No aid to Israel has been conditioned on these recommendations or support for
agreements with the PLO. The context of Israeli occupation and necessary Israeli steps
for improving the situation remain in publications of international organizations that
focus on the Palestinian territories and not in the publications for Israel. In this way, there
is a disconnect between what employees of international organizations know based on
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realities on the ground and their ability to actually affect the structural dislocations in the
Palestinian economy.119
4.2.2 Development Projects
Similar to the Oslo phase, development projects for Palestinians sought to align more
directly development activities with those of neoliberalism so that these values would
become incorporated into the conceptualization of Palestinian state formation. The logic
behind the developmental framework did not change significantly in the post-Oslo phase.
Good governance and other neoliberal prescriptions are encouraged through institutional
development by building and strengthening technical, management, and administrative
capabilities. Poverty is purportedly reduced by expanding access to productive assets,
employment is generated through labor intensive, private-sector development,
infrastructure is developed and improved to “increase the livelihood capacity” of
Palestinians and for the facilitation of trade and communications into global markets. 120
UNDP, for example, still has the same main focuses as the earlier period of 1) poverty
reduction through economic development and growth and 2) enhancing governance
institutions.121 As part of it governance development program, UNDP supports
“constructing courthouses and detention centers” in concretizing the neoliberal rule of
law and resolving conflicts through the (neo) liberal state.
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Development projects since the Oslo phase have tried to address some of the
criticisms of neoliberal development by making development packages appear more
participatory and locally oriented. UNDP, for example, notes that many of its
development programs “are developed from a participatory community-based
prioritization of local needs approach.”122 The World Bank connects gender to the
protection of private property. They state, “Although shari‟a law allows women to inherit
land, this is rarely practiced due to the fear of women to claim their land rights. Often
they forgo these rights in order to preserve harmony within the family. Such
discriminatory social practices will persist unless a standard legal system is established to
protect the land rights of all people.”123 On the surface these development programs
appear to be more participatory; however, even the World Bank admits that international
aid to Palestinians is highly motivated by donors‟ political views and has “created a
„shopping list‟ approach to development planning where projects are more aligned with
the donor‟s requirements than with local priorities.”124 Moreover, the ends remain the
same in neoliberal-based development programs – that of ensuring a stable environment
for business and capital accumulation – despite some the means to these ends changing in
emphasis to particular segments of the population.

Donors, Funding, and Aid Coordination
Despite minor changes, the international institutional architecture that coordinates and
manages aid to the Palestinian territories varies little from the Oslo period. The AHLC
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approved a number of changes in aid coordination and management on 14 December
2005. Currently, Norway is the chair of the AHLC, the EU and US are the co-sponsors,
and the World Bank serves as secretariat. At the capital level, the Quartet was given a
formal place in the aid coordination hierarchy, serving as an adjunct to the AHLC on
political matters. At the local level, the Local Development Forum (LDF) was
established, which replaced the LACC, along with the Humanitarian and Emergency
Policy Group (HEPG) and the Local Task Force for Palestinian Reform (LTFPR) that
were created in 2002. The LDF is open to PA representatives, donors, development
agencies, and a representative of Association of International Development Agencies
(AIDA). The LDF supervises aid and international support issues and is co-chaired by the
Palestinian Ministry of Planning, Norway, the World Bank, and UNSCO.125 The JLC was
dissolved in 2005 and then reinstated in September 2008, although aid coordination staff
of international organizations does not believe it will last long due to continuous political
instability.126
Between 2002 – 2005, the TFPR and seven Reform Support Groups (RSGs) were
established to specifically monitor and implement reform of PA institutions. The Civil
Society RSG was coordinated by Norway, Elections were coordinated by the EC and the
US, Financial Accountability was coordinated by the EC and the IMF, Judicial and Rule
of Law Reform was coordinated by EC and the Netherlands, Market Economics was
coordinated by the US and the World Bank, Local Government was coordinated by
Japan, and Public Administration and Civil Service Reform was coordinated by
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Germany, the World Bank, and the UK. Through these mechanisms international
institutions have a direct link to local institutions and can ensure institutional
development in the Palestinian territories is consistent with the norms and practices of an
emerging neoliberal world order.
In 2005, the RSGs and The Sector Working Groups were consolidated into four
Strategy Groups (SGs): economic, governance, infrastructure, and social development.
Each of the SGs are chaired by a Palestinian ministry and an international actor and
consist of a number of sector working groups, which are also co-headed by a Palestinian
ministry and international representative. The Economic Strategy Group is co-chaired by
the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank, the Governance Strategy Group is cochaired by the Ministry of Planning and the EC, the Infrastructure Strategy Group is cochaired by the Ministry of Housing and Pubic Works and USAID, and the Social
Development Strategy Group is co-chaired by the Ministry of Social Affairs and
UNSCO. Funds and projects are coordinated through the Local Aid Coordination
Secretariat (LACS) and the Task Force on Project Implementation (TFPI). Together the
LACS and TFPI work with sector-based strategy groups to implement neoliberal
development projects on the ground.127 As in the Oslo period, the expansive breadth of
international structures and social forces represents how deeply intertwined international
institutions are in Palestine‟s conceptualization and development. The neoliberal
condition in Palestine is developing with the direct assistance of international institutions,
which bring together international and domestic elite social forces in various arenas to
consolidate hegemony and a neoliberal conceptualization of Palestine.
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The power and price of such internationalization was showcased when the
international community boycotted the democratic election of Hamas to the PLC in
January 2006 and froze nearly all international assistance to the PA at that time. In
coordination with the World Bank, the EU formed a Temporary International Mechanism
(TIM) as a way to bypass PA institutions (temporary administered by Hamas) while
continuing to channel funds to neoliberal development projects and humanitarian relief in
the Palestinian territories. The EU TIM closely monitored funds and beneficiaries to
ensure that international assistance was only directed to those approved by international
donors. In 2008, the EU TIM was replaced with the Palestino-Européen de Gestion et
d'Aide Socio-Economique (PEGASE) mechanism, which is a longer-term instrument that
allows for continued monitoring and evaluation of international funds to the Palestinian
territories, but follows the timeline and framework of the internationally approved PRDP.
As in the Oslo period, World Bank Trust Funds play a large role in providing
institutional mechanisms for donors to channel international assistance to development
projects and humanitarian assistance in the Palestinian territories in the post-Oslo period.
Most notable is the PRDP Trust Fund, as it follows a similar thrust as PEGASE in using
the PRDP as the framework for financing. PRDP Trust funding is conditional upon
successful implementation of reforms as set out in the PRDP. While the entire PRDP
exemplifies Palestinian social forces presenting terms that are mutually agreeable to
international institutions through a neoliberal framework, the PRDP TF specially targets
political development through good governance within the PA as prescribed by
international institutions. According to the World Bank, “Key policy items include
expenditure containment (particularly wages and net lending) and progressive
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strengthening of public finance management…”128 Also similar to the PEGASE
mechanism, the PRDP TF guarantees thorough monitoring and evaluation of budget
allocation and progress toward PRDP implementation. Funds are dispersed upon
successful evaluation of PA quarterly reports by the World Bank and IMF.129 Through
aid coordination structures and various funding mechanisms international institutions
ensure neoliberal development programs continue in the Palestinian territories and
provide an opportunity for elite international and domestic social forces to collaborate on
the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony in the conceptualization of Palestinian state
formation.
Industrial Estates
When the second intifada started in 2000, construction of all proposed industrial estates
was halted. Despite the complete failure of the industrial estates program during the Oslo
process, certain social forces keen on creating small enclaves for limited capitalist
accumulation and integration in regional and global markets seek to revitalize and expand
the program. In a World Bank Technical Paper on industrial estates (IEs) in 2004, the
Bank says,
“In an improved operating environment, Palestinian entrepreneurs and foreign
investors will look for well serviced industrial lands and supporting infrastructure.
They will also seek a regulatory regime with a minimum of „red tape‟ and with
clear procedures for conducting business. Industrial estates, particularly those on
the border between Palestinian and Israeli territory, can fulfill this need and
thereby play an important role in supporting export-based growth.”130
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Four estates were proposed for revitalization or creation: EIE, GIE, Jenin (JIE), and
Tarqumiya (TIE). In addition, there is potential for a Tulkarem Peace Park (TPP), which
is favored by the Israeli and Palestinian private sectors because of its proximity to the
Israeli high tech corridor around Herzliya. Tulkarem was also the site of connection
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Oslo process, which is important to
investors should the possibility arise again for connection between the Palestinian
territories. According to World Bank, these sites are considered feasible because of their
locations to Israeli ports (Ashdod, Ashkelon, and Haifa), land availability, and potential
for movement of goods and people.131 The World Bank makes five recommendations for
the success of the industrial estates and free zones program.132 This includes, unfettered
access and movement of goods, linkages with Israeli businesses and markets, use of IEs
to increase exports, support for PIEFZA, PIEDCO, and other Palestinian private
development groups (Palestinian elite social forces), and an agreed protocol between
Israel and the Palestinians that would enable investors to utilize fully the IEs. In a
meeting held in Jerusalem on 30 March 2008 between US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Prime Minister Salaam
Fayyad, revival of the industrial estates and free zones program was a major topic for
discussion.133
A number of problems exist with these particular industrial estates in addition to
the larger problems posed by export-processing zones in general in developing countries.
TIE, for example, lies within Area C, which Israel directly controls. This is considered a
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Palestinian development project of which Palestinians have no control. To construct the
JIE, Palestinian farmland was confiscated in 1998 when the idea was originally
envisioned, and again in 2003 when the Israeli military seized the land for the separation
wall134 While the TPP is close to Israel‟s high tech corridor, it also lies within the “seam
zone” created as a result of Israel‟s separation wall. 135 The wall and all areas confiscated
by Israel for its construction was deemed illegal by the International Court of Justice in
2004, which effectively makes the wall and all economic activities illegal under
international law in those areas.136 It is unclear what legal ramifications this will have for
Israel in the future or any business operating within those areas.
One of the saddest realities of the industrial estates and free zone program is that
Karni Crossing, the site of the GIE, has become the only crossing for goods in and out of
the Gaza Strip, whether they are going to the GIE or not.137 The GIE in particular, and
industrial estates in general reinforce colonial practices imprinted on the process of
Palestinian state formation and neoliberal economic integration into regional and global
markets. Industrial estates and the free zone program are propped up as economic
development opportunities for the Palestinian economy and the Palestinian private sector
in particular, but the entire scheme embodies international elite social forces through the
form of Israel and international institutions working with Palestinian elite social forces in
the pursuit of personal capital accumulation. Together, these social forces configure the
process of conceptualizing Palestine to the norms of an emerging neoliberal world order.
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Agro-Industrial Park in the Jordan Valley

The proposed agro-industrial park in the Jericho area of the southern West Bank is part of
several development schemes for the Jordan Valley. On the local level, it is part of
JICA‟s Jericho and Jordan Valley Development Program that includes three sector-based
subprograms: governance, tourism, and agriculture. The agro-industrial park is also part
of JICA‟s regional development plan called the Corridor for Peace and Prosperity,
originally proposed in 2006 and aims to bring Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians
together for agricultural development and water management.138 More recently, the agroindustrial park idea has also been subsumed within the Valley of Peace initiative that has
been supported by Israeli President Shimon Peres and officially agreed to in 2007 by
Israel, Jordan, Japan, and the PA. The Valley of Peace plan integrates several
development projects including the JIE and the agro-industrial park in the Jericho area.
More recently, Quartet Representative Tony Blair has endorsed a number of “Quick
Impact Projects” of which the JIE, TIE, and the agro-industrial park in the Jericho area
are all part.139
Similar to industrial estates, the concept of an agro-industrial park in the Jordan
Valley seeks to bring together international and domestic social forces to implement
neoliberal development projects in the Palestinian territories. Specifically, JICA and other
international institutions aim to develop and expand agribusiness in the Jordan Valley,
which would allow a small amount of elite social forces to profit off the seasonal
advantage of the area and its untapped potential in the Gulf and European markets. The
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agro-industrial park would be a free-trade agricultural zone, where production of
agricultural commodities would be geared toward export markets. The agro-industrial
park would also be a facility where food processing would take place, from which
processed foods could also be exported to regional and global markets.
The stated purpose of the park is to generate investment, create jobs, and stimulate
agricultural and industrial development for producing competitive Palestinian products.
The Jordan Valley contains some of Palestine‟s most fertile land that has produced a
majority of Palestinian agriculture; however, Israel has confiscated much of this land for
settlements or closed military zones. Many Palestinian famers that have been
dispossessed of their lands have little choice other than becoming agricultural workers in
settlement-based agribusinesses. Rather than supporting local Palestinian social forces in
developing their own farms and productive capacity, JICA and other international
institutions have chosen instead to support a neoliberal form of agriculture in the Jordan
Valley. This will likely provides few options for dispossessed Palestinian famers, but will
be yet another arena for international and domestic elite social forces to collaborate in
configuring and conceptualizing a neoliberal vision of Palestine.
4.3 Summary
The post-Oslo period is permeated with the effects of the Oslo process, resulting in
worsening conditions for Palestinians and an intensification of the effects of international
institutions in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation. Israel has clearly proven that it
retains full control of Palestinian territories in its re-occupation of areas where
Palestinians were allowed a limited amount of “self-rule” under the auspices of the Oslo
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Accords. To prevent a humanitarian crisis and collapse of the PA, the international
community has poured more funds into the Palestinian territories than during the Oslo
process. While humanitarian aid is increasing, development aid is decreasing and
becoming progressively more conditioned on the PA‟s ability to implement successfully
neoliberal reforms. Concomitantly, the Palestinian economy is becoming more dependent
on international funding and elite Palestinian social forces are becoming more deeply
integrated into a neoliberal notion of state formation.
Palestinians were reminded how salient their governance structures were to
international intervention when the international community boycotted the democratically
elected government of the Palestinian people in January 2006. Funding to neoliberal
development programs continued albeit in ways that bypassed Hamas and rather
supported Palestinian social forces that were more agreeable to the neoliberal agenda in
an emerging world order. The eventual caretaker government and its PRDP reassured
international social forces that elite Palestinian social forces are capable of establishing
the neoliberal condition in Palestine and any conceptualization of state formation.
Policy recommendations are not greatly divergent from the Oslo process in that
neoliberal national structuring is the policy framework. Building and enhancing
institutional capacity along with harmonizing Palestinian standards with international
standards are policy priorities to establish the legal and regulatory framework necessary
for capital accumulation. The importance of these policies is enforced through aid
conditioning, which increasingly ties Palestinian institutional and policy reform with aid
disbursements. Also in the post-Oslo period, international institutions have started to
criticize Israel for imposing movement and access restrictions throughout the Palestinian
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territories, particularly through closure. However, these critical evaluations remain
decontextualized and the primary focus remains on the PA‟s ability to successfully
implement neoliberal reforms.
Development projects follow a similar logic now as in the Oslo process.
Developing institutional capacity, the private sector, infrastructure, and natural resources
are major sectoral priorities for neoliberal development in the Palestinian territories.
International funding for these projects is coordinated through a slightly modified
structure remaining from the Oslo period. The Quartet has been added at the capital level
while on the local level, the JLC exists intermittently and local sector working groups
have been condensed. International institutions remain active at each level of aid
coordination, management, and implementation, which ensures direct access to many
Palestinian institutions and funding for internationally approved neoliberal development
programs. The industrial estates development project was initially halted after the second
intifada began, however, international and certain Palestinian social forces seek to
reestablish the program as an engine for economic growth and integration into new
regional and world markets. In addition, an agro-industrial park is being planned in the
Jericho area. Similar to the industrial estates program, the agro-industrial park seeks to
create an agricultural free-trade zone by expanding agribusiness and producing
agriculture for export. Both the industrial estates and the agro-industrial park represent
the configuring of elite international and domestic social forces working towards the
consolidation of neoliberal hegemony in conceptualizing Palestine.
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion
There is a consensus among international institutions and other international social forces
about the conceptualization of a Palestinian state. Within this scheme, the political and
economic structures and processes should be congruent with international norms toward
neoliberalism. The recommendations and logic embodied in international institutions are
guided by principals that are engineered within the capitalist development framework as
designed by advanced, wealthy states and non-state elite social forces. To this end, the
proposed Palestinian state is supported, at least in theory, by every international
organization working in the Palestinian territories. This should not be confused with the
necessary negotiating of a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
Instead, what has clearly been implemented in the Palestinian territories is an ideology
surrounding the “proper” way an emerging state should politically and economically
develop. This means that local Palestinian social forces should embrace neoliberal values
in consolidating national hegemony and integrate into an emerging world order.
International institutions configure Palestine in two main ways. First, the
international community is complicit in Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands by
supporting imbalanced international agreements that clearly favor an industrialized
sovereign state over dispossessed native peoples and their claims to statehood. Israeli
domination of Palestinians through military occupation was institutionalized during the
Oslo process in the unequal nature and terms of the Accords. Designating certain “Areas”
in Palestinian territories to be controlled by varying degrees of Palestinians and Israelis
while concomitantly providing a pseudo-legal classification for Israeli settlements and
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their so-called natural growth in Palestinian territories implicitly showed international
acceptance for Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, which has led to de facto
fragmentation and deepening of Palestinian dislocation.
In addition, the Paris Protocol as stipulated in the Oslo Accords heavily skewed
trade, monetary, and fiscal policy in favor of Israel‟s already industrialized and protected
economy. Institutionalization of closure in and around Palestinian areas that was set out
in the Accords and in the process more generally has completely crippled the Palestinian
economy and prevented any hopes for a viable economy in a potential Palestinian state.
Because Palestinians were granted very little space to develop independently during the
Oslo period, the process institutionalized the current context from which inviability of a
potential Palestinian state derives. The more recent Roadmap to Peace embodies a similar
thrust and has yet to produce an independent, viable Palestinian state.
International institutions also configure Palestine by ensuring neoliberal values in
conceptualizing a potential state through policy recommendations and development
projects. While international organizations had operated in the Palestinian territories prior
to the 1990s, the Oslo process presented an opportunity for increased international
intervention into the Palestinian state building project. The World Bank and IMF were
prolific in developing key PA institutions and their corresponding policies that aimed to
create the correct legal and regulatory conditions for a neoliberal based, business-friendly
environment for capital accumulation. Policy prescriptions vary little from the Oslo phase
thru the post-Oslo period in that national structuring along neoliberal tenants of
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization were underscored. Particularly, trade
liberalization, private sector investment, and public sector management through good
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governance principals were major areas of policy emphasis for international institutions
during the Oslo process.
Development projects during that time worked in collaboration with policy
prescriptions to structure the conditions in Palestine along neoliberal lines. International
institutions largely supported the development of the PA to create public institutions that
would foster an investor friendly climate conducive to capital accumulation in the
Palestinian territories. This created a mechanism for domestic and international social
forces to consolidate neoliberal hegemony. Although all development projects during the
Oslo process supported the configuration of social forces for national neoliberal
structuring, the most evident was the Industrial Estates and Free Zones program. In an
attempt to separate economic and political variables through supposed “closure-proof”
enclaves, international institutions supported the development of export-processing zones
along the Green Line. Although ten industrial estates were promoted during the Oslo
process, the GIE was the only one to open its doors. International institutions played a
key role in conceptualizing and advancing the industrial estates through financial and
technical support.
During the Oslo process, the international community devised complex aid
coordination mechanisms to manage and implement donor funds. Elite social forces
through international institutions and foreign states were active at each level. At the
international level, the establishment of the AHLC, which still exists today, and the CG
formulated the overall aid strategy in the Palestinian territories. Beneath this level, the
JLC, LACC, and TFPI coordinated international funding. The LACC liaised between the
AHLC and Sector Working Groups, which were also co-chaired with international social
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forces. World Bank trust funds were important mechanisms for channeling funds to
neoliberal development projects during the Oslo period, particularly the Holst Fund as it
provided the startup costs associated with establishing PA institutions. Additionally, the
creation of PECDAR, which subsequently produced both the Ministry of Planning and
the Ministry of Finance, has had a lasting effect in drafting PA policies. The compilation
and complexity of these structures and processes has ensured a place for international
institutions in defining Palestine and its development.
Taken together, the nature and terms of the Oslo Accords, policy prescriptions,
and development projects during the Oslo process proved that international institutions
play a major role in shaping the neoliberal condition and conceptualization of Palestine.
The Oslo process set the foundation for international involvement in these processes.
International institutions have continued and expanded in this capacity in the post-Oslo
period, where change is mostly in emphasis rather than a change of course that could help
Palestinians build a viable state in the near future.
In the post-Oslo period, the negative, lasting effects of the Oslo process became
blatantly clear as Israel proved it retained ultimate control over Palestinian territories and
the international community severely punished the Palestinians for exercising their
democratic rights in the 2006 PLC elections. Shortly after the start of the al-Aqsa intifada
in 2000, Israel redeployed its military into all Palestinian territories, even those that had
been grated limited Palestinian autonomy under the Oslo Accords. International
institutions have provided immense amounts of humanitarian relief to Palestinians in the
post-Oslo phase to prevent starvation among Palestinians and the collapse of the PA;
however, the international community boycotted the Hamas-elected government in 2006
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and insisted on a government more amicable to neoliberal configuring. The caretaker
government embodies elite Palestinian political and economic social forces collaborating
with international institutions through terms that are mutually agreeable to ensure an
environment for domestic and international capital accumulation. The recent PRDP is a
glaring example of elite Palestinian social forces regurgitating the edicts of neoliberal
development toward Palestinian state formation.
The objectives of policy prescriptions and developments projects varied little
between the Oslo process and the post-Oslo period, rather differences lie in prioritization
and fund allocation. To stave off a major humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territories,
the international community has continually provided food and medical aid to
Palestinians, shifting international donor assistance from development towards
humanitarian relief in the post-Oslo phase. Policy recommendations followed a similar
thrust as those during the Oslo process, although international institutions became more
rigorous in pushing Palestinian neoliberal reform and structuring. Since the Oslo process,
there has been an increased emphasis on PA institutions and policies becoming more
aligned with neoliberal rules and practices in an emerging world order. To ensure that the
PA specifically, and Palestinian state formation more generally, follows a neoliberal path
the international community has started to condition international assistance on
successful implementation of the neoliberal reform agenda.
Similarly, donor-funded development projects did not change significantly in
terms of content in the post-Oslo phase. Some development projects purport to include
more local ownership in planning and implementation; however, this indicates an
integration of domestic and international social forces on terms that are mutually
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agreeable, rather than locally driven and supported development. In the post-Oslo period,
the industrial estates program has been rejuvenated and seeks to develop more exportprocessing zones in Palestinian territories. While export-processing zones have been
criticized for their inability to produce spillover effects and economic linkages in the
domestic economies that house them, the proposed industrial estates in the Palestinian
territories pose specific problems for Palestinian economic development. Each of the
proposed industrial estates lies in legally problematic areas and/or on lands that was
directly confiscated from Palestinian farmers. In Gaza, the Karni Crossing that contains
the GIE has become a direct symbol of Israeli occupation and siege as it has become the
only crossing allowed by Israel for export or imports into the coastal region. The agroindustrial park planned in the Jordan Valley also seeks to expand neoliberal development
through the creation of an agricultural free-trade zone that would support agribusiness
and integrate Palestinian agriculture into regional and global markets.
The complicated international aid architecture that was invoked during the Oslo
process was slightly amended in 2005 to include the Quartet at the international level and
consolidation of aid coordination groups on the local level. International institutions
remained active at every stage and played an even greater role once the international
community boycotted the democratic election results in the 2006 PLC elections. The EU
TIM, the more recent PEGASE, and the World Bank PRDP TF channel funds to
Palestinian social forces that agree to follow internationally directed neoliberal rules and
norms, and are willing to work toward the configuration of social forces that consolidate
neoliberal hegemony in conceptualizing Palestinian state formation. All these funding
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mechanisms condition funding on implementing neoliberal reforms in the Palestinian
territories.
The neoliberal values that international institutions have encouraged through
policy recommendations and development projects do not create a Palestinian state,
rather they are mechanisms for ensuring the ideological route for Palestine, whatever the
shape. In this way, international institutions have supported agreements, policies, and
development projects that all have been counterproductive to the necessary political
engagement that is needed to form a Palestinian state. Aid and neoliberal values cannot
substitute for the political process necessary to bring an end to the conflict and justice to
Palestinians.
Even if Palestinians were granted a state to the ends promoted by international
institutions and other social forces that celebrate neoliberal development, it is clear this
process would be problematic in the least and would certainly not amount to the
liberation Palestinians are seeking after decades of occupation. Supporting Palestinian
self-determination requires a political process that results in a political settlement for
Palestinians. Until that time comes, Palestine‟s internationalization will continue to
intensify by international and domestic elite social forces configuring the neoliberal
condition into the conceptualization of Palestine.
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